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ABSTRACT 
This paper produces a baseline security analysis of the Cloud 
Computing Operational Environment in terms of threats, 
vulnerabilities and impacts. An analysis is conducted and the top 
three threats are identified with recommendations for 
practitioners.  The conclusion of the analysis is that the most 
serious threats are non-technical and can be solved via 
management processes rather than technical countermeasures. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
K.6.5 [MANAGEMENT OF COMPUTING AND 
INFORMATION SYSTEMS]: Security and Protection – 
authentication, physical security, unauthorized access 
General Terms 
Management, Security 
Keywords 
Cloud Computing, Security, Risk Analysis 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Cloud computing provisioning companies are predicted to grow at 
a 20 percent compounded annual growth rate according to the 
technology consulting firm Gartner.1 Currently this space has an 
estimated 59 billion dollar market size for public and hybrid cloud 
structures.  There are many different implementations of cloud 
computing.  The most popular are Infrastructure as a Service 
(IaaS) - renting of computing and storage; Platform as a Service 
(PaaS) - renting of remote platform hosting; and Software as a 
Service (SaaS) - renting of software services.  The business case 
for this largely rests with organizations seeking to shift their 
Information Technology (IT) costs from Capital Expenditure 
Accounts (CapEx) to Operational Expenditure Accounts (OpEx). 
One more set of terms about Cloud Computing Technology is 
important to understand the issues surrounding the cloud, namely 
the distinction between Public Cloud, Private Cloud and Hybrid 
Cloud, as follows: 
1) Public Cloud - A public cloud is contained outside an 
organization.  An example of this type of service is 
Amazon Web Services Elastic Cloud Computing 
offering, which generates an “instance” of a network, 
server or application interconnected by the public 
Internet. 
2) Private Cloud - A private cloud is contained inside an 
organization.  An example of this type of service is an 
Enterprise Virtualization of PCs using thin client 
technology where the instances of the PC are delivered 
to the user’s desktop from a centralized server plant.  
The distinction that needs to be made is that the 
virtualized assets of the private cloud are behind some 
sort of organizational boundary from the public Internet, 
whereas the public cloud is not. 
3) Hybrid Cloud (Part Public/Part Private) - Most cloud 
implementations are hybrid clouds.  Even the most 
locked down private cloud likely has egress point(s) into 
the public Internet, if for no other reason than to access 
global infrastructure services such as Domain Name 
System (DNS) assets. 
The major issue concerning organizations is the security of cloud 
offerings.  The pooling of assets along with issues concerning 
virtualization are just a few of the rather new issues that have been 
introduced to the security community as this technology gets 
deployed.  One of the major ramifications for this is that the 
Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability (CIA) model requires 
modification to include Multi-party Trust, Mutual Auditability 
and Usability to form a “CIAMAU” model when talking about 
securing cloud computing assets.2  These additions to the security 
model are reserved for future work and do not affect the 
conclusion of this paper. 
In 2010 and 2011, two of the major cloud computing services 
(Amazon and Google) had major outages.3, 4  Neither one of these 
outages was due to a security issue, but these outages showed just 
how pervasive cloud computing has become as the outages 
gathered media coverage that included international attention.  
The issue with Google Documents was a change that exposed a 
memory management bug that only existed under very high loads.  
As organizations move to the cloud, most of the consequences of 
dysfunction will be economic and financial. There is a possibility 
of seeing health and safety issues regarding cloud-based systems 
that support utility and medical infrastructure.  This possibility has 
potentially very severe consequences.  In our analysis, the time 
required to fix the issue will be viewed as a major indicator of the 
impact of the event.  In this paper, availability is weighed as the 
major impact and needed to fix the issue as a major metric.5 
2. ASSETS TO BE ANALYZED 
An asset is what needs to be protected from threats to cloud 
security.  The types of assets considered in this analysis are 
computing and data elements in the cloud that affect one or more 
of the following: People, Activities and Operations, Information, 
Facilities and Equipment, and Materials.6  The way these elements 
are affected by them is via a standard CIA Framework.7 Table 1 
maps these assets of value with the cloud vulnerabilities, and 
organizes them into three categories: People, 
Processes/Operations, and Technical.8,9,10 
It is interesting to note that in the cloud computing space, most of 
the vulnerabilities affect the people, activities, operations, and 
informational assets of the organization.  Only the physical 
security vulnerability affects all of the asset classes. 
Criticality is a measure of consequences (high, medium or low) if 
an asset is lost or degraded.  The greater the threat of survival or 
viability to its owners, those nearby, or to others who depend on 
the asset, the more critical it is.11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Criticality is a very challenging thing to measure in the cloud 
computing space as the assets are pooled.  This creates transitive 
risks throughout the cloud framework that are simply not present 
in standard systems where there is a non-shared portfolio of 
assets.  Criticality can really only be brought into play when a 
detailed list of instances is compiled regarding the assets an 
organization puts into a cloud environment.  In this analysis, the 
terms Impact, Severity and Probability are used to achieve a 
similar result. 
Cloud computing has the potential to create unique and novel 
cascading effects that will cause a multiplier effect on the asset 
that is attacked.12There are serious implications to these cascade 
effects when cloud computing becomes ubiquitous, particularly in 
utility systems that have moved Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition (SCADA) and SCADA-like processes to the cloud.  
These effects are critical to understand, but unfortunately are 
beyond the scope of this paper.13 
Finally, vertically integrated effects need to be considered. The 
combination of vertically integrated effects and cascading effects 
can cause feedback loops in the attack that can drastically increase 
its effect.14 These effects are also beyond the scope of this paper, 
but they should be noted, as they are a major concern. 
3. VARIABLES IN THE MODEL 
 
3.1 “CIA” Defined 
Confidentiality is “Preserving authorized restrictions on 
information access and disclosure, including means for protecting 
personal privacy and proprietary information…” 
[44U.S.C.,Sec.3542].15 
Integrity is  “Guarding against improper information modification 
or destruction, and includes ensuring information non-repudiation 
and authenticity…”  [44U.S.C.,Sec.3542].16 
Availability is  “Ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of 
information…” [44U.S.C.,Sec.3542]17 
In cloud computing, three additional areas are added to the 
standard Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability domains.  The 
ones that are appended to CIA are Multi-party Trust, Mutual 
Auditability and Usability.18 
3.2 Threats 
 
An organization seeks to protect assets from threats. Cloud 
computing threat analysis reveals unique challenges.  One reason 
for this is the difficulty of maintaining the chain of logic between 
assets, vulnerabilities, and threats. The difficultly arises from the 
common pool nature of cloud computing and the break between 
customers and service providers.  As will be shown, a 
vulnerability that begins as a “People” vulnerability can transform 
into a threat that is more akin to a “Process” problem. The 
Saripalli & Walters paper deals with this issue by adding three 
more categories to the CIA model to reflect the transitive and 
shared nature of this issue.  This paper will attempt to preserve the 
chain of logic with the CIA framework.19 
 
This paper addresses five Technical Threats to Cloud Computing 
Assets.  These threats are: 
1) Management Interface Compromise (Technical) - Capturing 
vulnerabilities while using customer management front ends.20 
This threat is where a man-in-the-middle or some similar attack 
gets between the service provider and the management front end.  
Amazon Web Services has a feature where the user must 
download and authenticate with a public/private key pair to 
protect against this issue. 
2) Intercepting Data in Transit (Technical) - Failure in 
transmissions security leads to data sniffing and man-in-the-
middle attacks during transit.21 This a more generalized man-in-
the-middle attack than the Management Interface Compromise.  
In this type of attack, the actual production data going to and from 
the cloud is compromised. 
3) Data Leaks Between Customer and Cloud Providers. 
(Technical)22 - Intentional or unintentional “data leakage” 
between the customer and the cloud providers occurs.  This issue 
is a symptom of a much more serious process issue of disconnects 
between the customer and the cloud provider(s). 
Table 1. Description of Assets of Value 
Assets of Value 
 
Vulnerabilities 
People, Activities and 
Operations, Information, 
Facilities and Equipment, and 
Materials 
Physical Security 
People, Activities and 
Operations, Information 
Data Lockout 
People, Activities and 
Operations, Information 
Loss of Data 
People, Activities and 
Operations, Information 
Common Stack 
Vulnerabilities 
People, Activities and 
Operations, Information 
Execution Control 
People, Activities and 
Operations, Information 
Multiparty Cloud Config 
People, Activities and 
Operations, Information 
Authorization Issues 
People, Activities and 
Operations, Information 
Real Time Access Issues 
People, Activities and 
Operations, Information 
Identity Management 
People, Activities and 
Operations, Information 
Security of Virtual App 
People, Activities and 
Operations, Information 
Int and Ext Cloud App 
Interaction 
People, Activities and 
Operations, Information 
Trusted APIs 
People, Information Privacy of Data 
  
 
Legend 
 
People - Blue 
 
Processes/Ops - Red 
 
Tech - Green 
 
 
4) Distributed Denial of Service (Technical)23 – The attacker may 
use up all the metered resources of the customer.24 The goal is to 
achieve “resource exhaustion” which is when the system is taxed 
more than it can handle. 
5) Hypervisor Compromise (Technical)25 – The core of the cloud 
has vulnerabilities.  A hypervisor is the core of the virtualization 
technology that is at the heart of most cloud computing offerings.  
The integrity of hypervisor systems is a potentially serious threat. 
This paper addresses five Operational/Process Threats to Cloud 
Computing Assets.  These threats are:26 
6) Isolation Failure (Processes) - Failure in separating storage, 
memory and routing causes Isolation Failure.27  Isolation failure is 
an operational issue (and/or possibly a people issue) in virtually 
all cases.  The interesting thing about this issue is that many other 
derivative threats and dysfunctions can arise from this issue.  This 
is an issue that is relatively easy to resolve. 
7) Insecure or Ineffective Deletion of Data (Processes) - Improper 
deletion of data creates this threat and is particularly relevant 
when moving cloud providers.28 This issue is another process-
oriented issue that can be handled by effective management.   
8) Conflicts Between Customer Handling/Hardening Procedures 
and Cloud Environment (People).29 - As this paper will show, this 
issue is the most pressing threat in the Cloud Computing Space. 
9) Cloud Provider Malicious Insider (People) - Cloud provider 
employee maliciously alters, corrupts or locks out customer data 
to create this threat. 
10) Resource Exhaustion (People) – The over- or under-
provisioning of cloud resources due to mismanagement or attack 
creates this threat.30 
3.3 Vulnerabilities 
 
Vulnerability is a gap or weakness in security that can be 
exploited by threats to gain unauthorized access to an asset. As 
was shown in Table 1, this paper will categorize vulnerabilities in 
three ways - People, Processes/Operations and Technical.  The 
vulnerability list from the paper written by Sengupta, Kaulgud & 
Sharma will be used, and will be categorized into these bins.31  A 
quick overview of these vulnerabilities is in order.  Sengupta, 
Kaulgud & Sharma see four distinct areas of vulnerabilities to the 
cloud environment.  They are: 
1) Cloud Infrastructure, Platform and Hosted Code. 
2) Data, Data Integrity, Data Remanence, Data Privacy. 
3) Access - Authentication, Authorization, and Access 
Control (AAA), encrypted data communications, and 
user identity management. 
4) Regulation.32 
All of these will be categorized except for number 4 (Regulation), 
which is an interesting and important topic, but, like cascade 
effects, is beyond the scope of this effort. 
The three People-related vulnerabilities are 1) Physical Security of 
Data Center, 2) Data Lock Out in case of Provider Failure, and 3) 
Prevention of Data Loss.33  Two of these: (Data Lock Out and 
Prevention of Data Loss), may also be seen as process errors.  
However, it is difficult to comprehend how a cloud provider could 
not have the processes in place to deal with these issues.  In fact, 
if the management of the cloud provider does not have a solution 
in place to prevent these issues, it goes to a “people” issue at the 
management level. 
The following seven vulnerabilities are grouped into the 
Operation/Processes Bin.  All come from the Sengupta, Kaulgud 
& Sharma paper.34 
1) Common Stack Vulnerability - This is where a virtualized 
instance of one customer somehow bleeds or affects another 
customer’s instance. 
2) Execution Control - This is where the customer has abstracted 
execution and the control is mostly in the hands of the provider. 
3) Data Remanence - This is where the customer’s data is 
somehow exposed after a move or a change in cloud providers. 
4) Multiple Party Cloud Confidentiality - This is related to the 
Common Stack Vulnerability above, but is more specific to 
confidentiality concerns. 
5) Authorization – This is ensuring that only authorized assets are 
available. 
6) Access issues - As the provider is closer to this data, there is a 
concern that unauthorized access may occur. 
7) Identity Management35 
Last, these four vulnerabilities from Sengupta, Kaulgud & Sharma 
will be assigned to the Technical Bin. 
1) Security of the Virtualized Application - This is a more 
technical reading of the Common Stack Vulnerability.  Where 
common stack issues are really a process issue, this issue goes 
more into the technical set up of the hypervisor. 
2) Internal and Cloud Based Application Interaction and Isolation 
– this is a lower level reading of “Execution Control” and 
“Multiple Party Cloud Confidentiality” from the prior section. 
3) Trusted APIs - This issue goes to the cloud provider doing his 
due diligence and only using signed and current API instances. 
4) Privacy of Data36 - This issue goes to the ability of the cloud 
provider and/or user to comply with laws, norms and standards 
regarding private data such as Personally Identifiable Information 
(PII). 
Then, ideally, potential Threats poised to exploit the 
Vulnerabilities stated should be addressed. For example, identity 
thieves could be a Threat poised to exploit the Vulnerability of 
poor training, and thereby cause a failure of Confidentiality.  
Notice the chain of logic between the Assets of Value, 
Vulnerability, and Threat, linked to (in this example) 
Confidentiality.  The granularity in this chain of logic is important 
but this paper will focus on a threat-based analysis and leave the 
strict but necessary linkage between Vulnerability and Threat for 
future work. 
3.4 Threat Impacts 
Impacts will now be addressed.  Table 2 shows the Threat Impact 
to Cloud Computing Assets.  The Impact is stated as “High” or 
“Low” and is scored as a 2 for a High ranking and a 1 for a Low 
ranking.  Because of the unique nature of pooled computing 
resources, the impact is rarely a Low ranking.  As a general rule, 
the scoring tended to be Low if the threat could be addressed in a  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
rapid manner of time.  Distributed denial of service is one 
example of a low threat level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.5 Risk Level 
 
Risk results from threats exploiting vulnerabilities to obtain, 
damage or destroy assets.  The Impact derived from Table 2, 
when combined with the credibility of Threat and degree of 
Vulnerability, yields a Risk Level (High, Medium, or Low). The 
Risk for each area (Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability) 
must be stated.  Shown in Table 3 (Risk Metrics and Calculation 
per Threat) is the Risk Level.  The goal of this calculation is a 
“probability score” for each threat.  This approach is distinctly 
utilitarian and is used to find the top three threats.  The analysis is 
very simple and straightforward.  For each threat, a “level of 
severity” is scored in terms of confidentiality, integrity and 
availability. 
Scoring the “Low” threats with a value of 2, the “Medium” threats 
with a score of 4 and the “High” threats with a score of 8 begins 
the next phase.  The paper then sums these three values to assess a 
“Severity Score”.  Then, the “Impact” value is factored in by 
multiplying the “Impact” by the “Severity Score” to obtain the 
“Total”.  At this point, the probability that this event will happen 
must be determined. 
 
The next task is issuing a “Level of Probability” as “Low”, 
“Medium” or “High” whilst assigning a value of 1, 2, or 4 
respectfully.  That score is then multiplied by the “Total” to get a 
score in the “Probability” field.  This score, when ranked high to 
low, shows which are the most serious threats (High) and the least 
serious ones (Low).  The definition of Risk (R) used is the 
Probability of the event (P) times its Severity (S) times its Impact 
(I) or R = P * S * I. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 – Threat Impact 
Threats Impact 
 High - 2, Low - 1 
Resource Exhaustion 2 
Malicious Insider 2 
Interception Data in Transit 2 
Data Leaks 2 
Distributed Denial of Service 1 
Hypervisor Compromise 2 
Isolation Failure 2 
Improper Deletion of Data 1 
Conflicts between customer 
procedures and cloud provider 
procedures 
2 
Insecure interface and APIs 2 
Physical Theft 2 
  
  
  
Legend  
People - Blue  
Processes/Ops - Red  
Tech - Green  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 - Risk Metrics and Calculation per Threat. 
Threat Impact Risk Level  
 High - 
2, Low 
- 1 
Category 
Confidentiality 
- C Integrity - 
I Availability - 
A 
Level of 
Severity 
(L=2, 
M=4, 
H=8) 
Severity 
Score 
Total 
(Severity 
x 
Impact) 
Level of 
Probability 
(L=1,M=2, 
H=4) 
Probability 
Score 
Resource 
Exhaustion 
2 C 
I 
A 
2 
2 
8 
12 24 1 24 
Malicious Insider 2 C 
I 
A 
8 
8 
2 
18 36 2 72 
Interception Data in 
Transit 
2 C 
I 
A 
8 
8 
4 
20 40 1 40 
Data Leaks 2 C 
I 
A 
8 
8 
2 
18 36 1 36 
Distributed Denial 
of Service 
1 C 
I 
A 
2 
4 
8 
14 14 1 14 
Hypervisor 
Compromise 
2 C 
I 
A 
4 
4 
4 
12 24 1 24 
Isolation Failure 2 C 
I 
A 
8 
4 
2 
14 28 1 28 
Improper Deletion 
of Data 
1 C 
I 
A 
8 
4 
2 
14 14 1 14 
Conflicts between 
customer 
procedures and 
cloud provider 
procedures 
2 C 
I 
A 
4 
8 
2 
14 28 4 112 
Insecure interface 
and APIs 
2 C 
I 
A 
2 
4 
8 
14 28 1 28 
Physical Theft 2 C 
I 
A 
8 
8 
8 
24 48 2 96 
        
Legend 
       People - Blue 
       Processes/Ops - Red 
       Tech - Green 
        
4. RECOMMENDATION OF SECURITY 
CONTROLS 
 
This paper will now endeavor to make intelligent, defensible and 
implementable recommendations.  A protection, detection and 
correction scheme will be used to address these countermeasures.  
The only additional data is a summation section which rank orders 
the “Probability Score” and identifies the top three threats for the 
application of security controls. 
The top threat to address is a process issue.  It is the conflict 
between customer procedures and cloud provider procedures.  
This seemingly straightforward issue is more complex than meets 
the eye.  As was stated earlier in the paper, the issue of shared 
context between the cloud service provider and the customer 
remains a serious and divisive issue.  The second most severe 
issue is one of simple physical theft of the cloud computing assets.  
This has been the source of many of the data breaches, 
particularly in the health care sector.  The third most serious issue 
is one of the malicious insider.  It is interesting to note that none 
of these issues are particularly complex to understand. 
5. COUNTERMEASURES 
 
Table 4 (Countermeasures) shows the top three issues and the top 
three countermeasures.  They are not complex issues and they are 
not complex solutions.  Organizations would do well to 
implement these very basic processes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
Cloud computing is here to stay.  The security issues around this 
technology are real.  The actions that senior management must 
ensure happen before the organization moves to use this 
technology are as follows: 
6.1 Service Level Agreements Are Critical 
Organizations must have solid Service Level Agreements (SLA) 
with the Cloud Provider.  These agreements should include what 
happens if the Cloud Provider goes insolvent and the terms of 
violation of the SLA should be extremely punitive.  The web 
article “Seven Lessons to learn from Amazon’s Outage” makes 
excellent points about this.37  The major point made is that 
Amazon’s cloud service was down for four days and they still did 
not technically breach their SLA.  There is no way that an 
organization can ensure security unless the SLA contract is 
thought through completely. 
6.2 Physical and Personnel Standards 
 
Organizations must implement Federal Information Security 
Management Act (FISMA) standards in the area of Physical 
Security, both at the customer site and at the cloud provisioning 
sites.  Physical access to the actual virtual machines or the storage 
means that all of the data of the organization will be considered 
compromised. 
Management may see it as unusual that this cutting edge 
technology has such pedestrian issues as major concerns but 
management should not be fooled.  These are expensive and 
complex domains and require relentless discipline to sustain.  
Addressing these issues give significant value for an organization 
to move to the cloud securely.  It may well be that by moving on 
these issues first that the more complex issues will be much 
simpler to solve. 
A contingency plan would be to partially transition to the cloud 
for low risk systems and test the technology.  This plan has risks if 
cloud computing provides the competitive advantages that are 
predicted. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 – Countermeasures 
Issue Countermeasure 
Conflicts 
between 
customer 
procedures 
and cloud 
provider 
procedures 
Exhaustively researched and staffed  
Service Level Agreement Contracts 
Physical 
Theft 
Standard FISMA 
Physical Security Procedures 
Malicious 
Insider 
Standard FISMA  
Personnel Security Procedures 
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